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I believe, but am not certain, that the advantage has always been with the insurgents in an invasion.
Depends on several things
1)How brutal the invaders are willing to be.
2)What the invaders are willing to give.
3)Were the people previously in charge ****s?
4)Is anyone willing to supply arms and training to the insurgents. Especially in useful stuff like explosives and electrical gear. At least until it stops being an insurgency and starts being a rebellion/civil war.
Its best if the action to 3 is yes to 2)quite a lot and 1)somewhat but in a controlled manner.
It also works with 1)extremely for the entire province/state and 2)slightly however nowadays a leader having commemorative wall art set up showing them having lunch with a rebel kings head hanging in the trees nearby might be somewhat frowned on.
Most good Empire builders from the Romans to the British worked on finding some annoyed second cousin to the current king so they would come in as friends helping out an internal rebellion.
The glorious revolution is good example of this. In most of the UK its remembered as a "glorious" revolution" but in Northern Ireland (depending on the constituency) its a bit more complicated and the Dutch view of it is also rather different.
I think the latter view does seem more accurate. It was an invasion where the invader was willing to make a bunch of compromises to minimise conflict but still meet their key objectives namely removing a threat and also getting a ton of cash.
All of this is probably temporary, tactics and technology will evolve and probably put effective high tech counter drone technology back in the hands of larger wealthier countries.
Exactly this. It's an evolving scenario, Ukraine has used youth to out-think the old guard in Russia
Tickets on sale now. Sponsored by Stark (yes, really) and Helsing with Babcock as the investor in new industries https://my.rusi.org/events/land-warfare-conference-2026.html
An article by Fabian Hoffman, a Doctoral Research Fellow at Oslo Uni specialising in missile technology, nuclear strategy, and European defence.
Ukraine's Deep-Strike Drone Campaign Against Russian Oil Infrastructure
How Ukraine is systematically degrading Russian energy export capacity — and what it means for the war,
"Independent verification of specific damage figures remains difficult. That said, the intensity and success of Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign have very likely reached levels not seen since the start of the war."
"The success of Ukraine’s deep-strike drone campaign is not accidental. It reflects sustained planning and shaping efforts, compounded by industrial bottlenecks on the Russian side."
"The cumulative effects of these constraints are real, bearing meaningfully on Russia’s budget and planning even if they fall short of collapsing its capacity to wage war. In this regard, the analogy to the Allied strategic bombing campaign against the Nazi German war economy in World War II, which I have drawn previously, remains as valid as ever.
https://substack.com/home/post/p-193868672
Quantity still matters - it’s just drone quantity now. For instance Ukraine now launches more long range drones per night than Russia.
Hopefully the change of regime in Hungary means Ukraine will get the 90 billion EU loan now.
Indeed.
I also think that everyone except USA is planning a future *without* USA. That includes Russia.
I also think that everyone except USA is planning a future *without* USA. That includes Russia.
We are watching the US hegemony and global dominance collapse in real time. The shuffle for positioning in a new multi polar world is going to be messy and probably violent. As per the apocryphal curse, we live in interesting times.
The shuffle for positioning in a new multi polar world is going to be messy and probably violent.
I'm reminded of comments along the lines of "it can't be worse than what we've had". Which obviously it can be, and much much worse.
Hopefully not mind you. Although I am on balance expecting something quite severe before the war in Ukraine ends.
The shuffle for positioning in a new multi polar world is going to be messy and probably violent.
Looking at Taiwan, Korea's, some of North Africa....and of course let us not forget that the nutter in the Kremlin or White House could choose to invade the Vatican City or Finland at any time
Quantity still matters - it’s just drone quantity now. For instance Ukraine now launches more long range drones per night than Russia.
There’s quite a long post here from Kyiv Post, which includes an entertaining piece near the end detailing a very creative approach to using drones for demolishing large bridges, the bridge over the Konka River.
Useful video from APN on integrating Ukraine into European defence in future if (when) the US withdraws from NATO. It points out things which the good folk on here probably already know, but the wider public may not due to warped press reporting. Russia has been brought to a stalemate not because they are weak, they have the biggest army in Europe, but because Ukraine is strong. Ukraine has the second largest army in Europe, and it is considerably larger than all of its European neighbours. The concept that we are propping up a weak Ukraine with handouts, which may have had some truth at the start of the war is now wrong. Not just the size, battle experience and determination of their 900,000 strong military, but their burgeoning and innovative defence industry.
In a future Europe without US involvement, it will be essential to have Ukraine fully integrated into European defence. Not as a bit part, making up the numbers, but as the most capable and effective element when it comes to standing up to Russia. He also explains how Ukraine's geography would make it much more difficult for Russia to attack the Baltic states in future. He suggests (as we have on here) that NATO membership is a non starter, but a very similar European defensive alliance, with Ukraine fully integrated is needed.
So nothing new or startling for the well informed, but a useful summary.
A JEF for central Europe perhaps
JEF is perhaps a useful framework for a larger organisation. It won't be without problems of course. The larger it is, the more unwieldy and slow to react and the more potential for political infighting. JEF currently, without the likes of France and Germany has the potential to be agile and responsive but lacks the numbers, sustainability and range of capability a larger European force would bring. Another advantage of JEF, is that it is made up of very motivated partners with "skin in the game". Those closest to an aggressive Russia with the most to lose in a Russian attack. Would a much larger organisation with the likes of Spain and Italy in it, be so willing to react forcefully to a Russian incursion in (for example) the Baltics? A future version of JEF with Ukraine and Poland in it could be very effective, but Germany and France will have to have a role somehow too. Lots of questions for the diplomats and defence planners to tussle with in future!
I was thinking very specifically of an equivalent to JEF in central Europe rather than an expansion of JEF to central Europe.
OK. Interesting, which countries would you see being members?
Not central European, but
LISBON, April 15 (Reuters) - Portugal is against the creation of a separate European army and instead backs strengthening and modernising its armed forces within the U.S.-led NATO alliance, the country's defence minister said, contrasting with neighbouring Spain's position. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/portugal-unlike-spain-rejects-separate-european-army-2026-04-15/
Various open sources seem to indicate that recruitment into the Russian military is slowing in Q1 2026 as compared to Q1 2025. The different sources are discussed at greater length in the full articles. Ukraine is actively targetting a greater number of Russian casualties than are recruited and a greater number of casualties than in any previous year.
If these numbers are accurate then Russia will be facing the politically unpalatable choice of mobilisation of further reserve forces to Ukraine. The unpalatability can be judged by the fact that mass mobilisation has been resisted since 2022 and a new law that was added to the statute books in October 2025. This allowed Russian reserve forces to be deployed outside Russia with minimal training and without a declaration of either "mobilisation" or "war", i.e. a mobilisation that isn't called mobilisation in the hope that the populace won't protest as much.
Such a mobilisation would likely be smaller and ongoing, rather than en masse, which is important in the run up to September's elections. A high turn-out in elections and a semblance of democracy is necessary to Russians.
"German Institute for International and Security Affairs economist Janis Kluge assessed on April 12 based on an analysis of the budgets of Russian federal subjects that Russian forces recruited between 800 and 1,000 soldiers a day in the first quarter of 2026 (between January 1 and March 31, 2026), compared to 1,000 to 1,200 a day in the first quarter of 2025, a 20 percent decrease year-over-year."
Russia has been transferring small numbers of troops from more specialised units to frontline infantry positions. Units that aren't as called upon, e.g. tank battalions, have been reportedly losing a soldier a week transferred to support either infantry or drone operations. This will impact mechanised numbers should Russian forces ever be in a position to advance through the Dnipro Lowlands, which isn't looking likely to date.
"The Russian military command is reportedly employing servicemembers of tank battalions as infantry replacements. A Russian milblogger amplified on April 14 a letter reportedly from a subscriber that claims that the tank battalion of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) almost never uses tanks in combat and that the Russian military command instead takes two soldiers from each battalion’s company every two to three weeks to support infantry assaults and drone operators."
Ukraine's side of the recruitment shortfall has involved discussions on Ukrainian men seeking asylum in Europe having left Ukraine illegally. This has been raised most recently with Germany at the highest level, between President Zelensky and Chancellor Merz, during the signing of several mutual co-operation agreements yesterday.
Sources:
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2026/
Russian forces appear to be concentrating on taking ground towards the so-called "fortress belt" cities, rather than further south where its forces are losing control over contested areas.
The linked article is a useful breakdown of the fortress belt with a variety of maps separately illustrating population density and urban development (including land use), water features, elevation and slope, and prepared defensive fortifications.
It underlines why the cities of the fortress belt have been chosen for the defence of Ukraine and why Russia is unlikely to capture much this year, despite being on the back doorstep of the southern-most city of Kostyantynivka. The cities are all industrial centres and have large defensible buildings, although at a quick look they don't appear to have much mining infrastructure to take advantage of for logistics storage and shelter.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-importance-of-ukraines-fortress-belt-geospatial-intelligence-terrain-analysis/
Russian forces have also increased pressure in the north around Sumy, which is close to the border with Russia.
"The Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) reported on April 13 that Ukrainian forces moved to new prepared positions near Myropilske (east of Sumy City on the international border) due to “intensive combat operations” and Russian numerical superiority. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 14 that Russian forces advanced near Myropilske. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 10 that Russian forces seized Myropilske."
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2026/
US sanctions on Russian oil are back in force. The agreement has naturally lapsed without renewal, which is combined with continuing infrastructure problems at Russian ports.
The largest tankers can't get in to Novorossiysk and only one smaller crude berth and a couple of petroleum berths are available,
"Oil exports from Novorossiysk, Russia’s largest Black Sea port, remain limited after two of the terminal’s largest berths failed to resume operations following Ukrainian drone attacks last week, Bloomberg reports."
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/73937
It's widely reported that Japan is easing restrictions on its arms exports that were largely imposed as part of the national feeling of pacifism following WW2.
It maintains an active defence industry and is in partnership with the UK and Italy on the Global Combat Air Programme (as opposed to the UK/Italy FCAS programme).
Various nations have expressed interest in the potential offerings. Japan's Mitsubishi has been building F35 aircraft (since 2025) and Patriot missiles (since early 2000s) and exported coals to Newcastle, errr, Patriots to the US, last year, although they're licensed by the US so are unlikely to be exported more generally.
https://youtube.com/shorts/PPavsMVticw?si=fw06K7RY5gL2TIML
Could be here or the Hungary thread I guess
If these numbers are accurate then Russia will be facing the politically unpalatable choice of mobilisation
@timba, what's you thoughts on the likelihood of Putin declaring full mobilisation? Obviously dangerous for him personally/politically, given the protests that it sparked last time the rumors about it surfaced. But at the same time I can see why a 'limited call up' just short of mobilisation would provide him with hugely more offensive capabilities.
The Ukrianian tactic of inflicting massive attrition for tiny land advances has worked thus far, but an overwhelming "Schwerpunkt" (to borrow from Wehrmacht, which seem apropos) might be the breakthrough that Russia/Putin is hoping for.
If these numbers are accurate then Russia will be facing the politically unpalatable choice of mobilisation
@timba, what's you thoughts on the likelihood of Putin declaring full mobilisation? Obviously dangerous for him personally/politically, given the protests that it sparked last time the rumors about it surfaced. But at the same time I can see why a 'limited call up' just short of mobilisation would provide him with hugely more offensive capabilities.
The Ukrianian tactic of inflicting massive attrition for tiny land advances has worked thus far, but an overwhelming "Schwerpunkt" (to borrow from Wehrmacht, which seem apropos) might be the breakthrough that Russia/Putin is hoping for.
I think that you'd need a greater appreciation of how Russian people think than my minimal understanding, but maintaining a social contract with the population in exchange for their loyalty is clearly important.
Domestic security, controls and the law have tightened, but the social contract is still there despite the machinery of autocracy being tuned up.
As to an overwhelming main effort; I'm not sure that it's possible under current conditions to mobilise, equip and logistically support a full compulsory call-up.
Smaller, covert mobilisations (students, prisoners, PMCs absorbed by the MoD, etc) to date have seen troops without boots, weapons, body armour, uniform not matched to terrain, vehicles with fake reactive armour, etc, which is partially explained by levels of higher command corruption, evidenced by the current wave of command moves, arrests and charges.
Odious grifter JD Vance has been trumpeting one of his proudest achievements as ceasing funding Ukraine.
That'll please his Moscow line manager.
As to an overwhelming main effort; I'm not sure that it's possible under current conditions to mobilise, equip and logistically support a full compulsory call-up.
Up thread I posted an APN video where they talk about the likelihood of something relatively major and definitely nasty being a late effort to break European support for Ukraine.
That wouldn't be something done to Ukrainians, but to another European country.
I don't know what's going to happen or when obviously, but it's clear Putin is pretty desperate to not lose so it seems plausible something will happen before then end of the war. As by that point, if there's no meaningful win for Putin he will start running out of things to lose.
Odious grifter JD Vance has been trumpeting one of his proudest achievements as ceasing funding Ukraine.
Quick distract MAGA from us taking a strategic loss to Iran, not forcing Ukraine to capitulate, damaging US security, the Boss and his protection of peadophiles that he also hung out with for most of his life, massive corruption, the Boss and his increasingly clear mental instability and ineptitude, helping our political allies take massive electoral losses, and hopefully nobody is asking where the "gazillions" of "extra" foreign investment is, or even noticing that tariffs are now being paid for with a direct increase of cost to the US consumer.
As to an overwhelming main effort; I'm not sure that it's possible under current conditions to mobilise, equip and logistically support a full compulsory call-up.
Up thread I posted an APN video where they talk about the likelihood of something relatively major and definitely nasty being a late effort to break European support for Ukraine.
That wouldn't be something done to Ukrainians, but to another European country.
I don't know what's going to happen or when obviously, but it's clear Putin is pretty desperate to not lose so it seems plausible something will happen before then end of the war. As by that point, if there's no meaningful win for Putin he will start running out of things to lose.
I've only listened once, but I think that what he's saying is that Ukraine is vital to defend against a combined Russia-Belarus attack. In that event, Russian military planners would need to be able to discount Ukraine, which surely makes an early decisive attack on Ukraine more rather than less likely.
We had months of notice of a Russian build-up pre-2022, although the EU ignored UK and US warnings. To build a force Russia would need to move its combat-hardened troops a looong way north from southern Ukraine because mobilised troops tend to be poorly trained and equipped.
The "running out of things to lose" could equate to a nuclear strike, but hopefully that will remain off the table. Europe has few nukes, but Russia has few major population centres.
I think that a build-up will be taken a bit more seriously in Europe now
A catch-all article that's worth reading. It has links to more in-depth items, e.g. Ukraine's first combined bomb and missile attack with NATO weapons. That item shows the planning that goes into strikes to make the use of stand-off weapons survivable for aircraft; only S300/400/500 missiles could have touched the launch aircraft, but the munitions used are vulnerable to shorter-ranged air defences.
The US State Dept has belatedly recognised that Cuban troops are being used in Ukraine (they were also trusted as the Presidential Guard in Venezuela). It's unusual for this WH to be at all supportive of Ukraine, hmmm, leaked to media-outlet Axios, let's take a wild stab in the dark... https://www.kyivpost.com/post/74013
A quick update from Ukraine's commander, General Oleksandr Syrskyi and the Ministry of Defence.
Combined air and ground drone combined arms tactics developed in the field and working well https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-retakes-50-sq-km-territory-march-army-chief-says-2026-04-15/
Ah, have I looked at the wrong vid?
I followed the APN link from BUTR, "Ukraine's Role in Europe's Security"
I'll have to look at that link later ^^
Talking of hybrid attacks on the UK/Europe. There's a perfect target down here in Kent for Putin, the SS Richard Montgomery.
A WW2 liberty ship that sunk right next to a town on the isle of Sheppey. Has around 1400 tonnes of explosives on board, so about 1/10 if the explosive power of the nukes dropped on Japan. No government has had the balls to deal with it as yet and it's becoming increasingly unstable.
Something as simple as a time delayed hand grenade dropped on it from a small boat/kayak would likely be enough to trigger a massive explosion with a very high amount of plausible deniability for Russia.
SS Richard Montgomery - Wikipedia https://share.google/0sITHYthn3moHzPAV
1,400 tons of explosives jin a boat ust off the coast near the harbour? Rings a bell!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1944_Bombay_explosion
A little off topic, but they're planning on removing Monty's masts. Think if I lived on the north Kent coast, I'd be planning a long holiday!
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ce84zk7m5rko
Something as simple as a time delayed hand grenade dropped on it from a small boat/kayak would likely be enough to trigger a massive explosion
It's not quite that simple. Dropping explosives from the surface would be very hit and miss and you'd need something much bigger than a hand grenade to be in with much chance of causing sympathetic detonation of the whole cargo. Even then there'd be a lot of luck needed. To guarantee it, you'd need multiple high explosive donor charges placed directly on the larger munitions (aircraft bombs) in key positions, linked with det cord and initiated simultaneously. This would require hours, if not days of work by a skilled diving team.
I am not saying it's safe or that an accidental explosion is impossible, far from it. Just that it's a little bit less of a risk than some of the more lurid headlines over the years might suggest.
I spent 7 years on Foulness working with a scientific staff who's expertise was explosives and we did a lot of explosive safety testing. There was a whole other establishment that dealt just with environmental testing of explosives. No one was unduly worried about it going bang.
As to an overwhelming main effort; I'm not sure that it's possible under current conditions to mobilise, equip and logistically support a full compulsory call-up.
Up thread I posted an APN video where they talk about the likelihood of something relatively major and definitely nasty being a late effort to break European support for Ukraine.
That wouldn't be something done to Ukrainians, but to another European country.
I don't know what's going to happen or when obviously, but it's clear Putin is pretty desperate to not lose so it seems plausible something will happen before then end of the war. As by that point, if there's no meaningful win for Putin he will start running out of things to lose.
I've got the correct video now 🙂
I think that part of the problem is that the video is 11 days old now and a lot has changed, including elections in Hungary, one quote from the video is,
And there's so much happening. It's dizzying.(46:22)
I'd still go with my comments about the later APN video ^^ that argue against full mobilisation and a direct attack on Europe,
I've only listened once, but I think that what he's saying is that Ukraine is vital to defend against a combined Russia-Belarus attack. In that event, Russian military planners would need to be able to discount Ukraine, which surely makes an early decisive attack on Ukraine more rather than less likely.
I'd suggest that the loss of Hungary's vote against EU actions will also change the calculation in Russia, along with the unpredictability of the US, e.g. energy sanctions back on after temporary reprieve, will they respond to an Article 5 NATO defence request? the loss of Iran's weapon support with the destruction of Caspian Sea shipping, Russia's clear support of Iran against US interests, etc.
I think that Russia will go after potential allies within the EU to replace Hungary, e.g. PM Babiš in the Czech Republic, PM Fico in Slovakia and, from the fringes of EU accession, President Vučić of Serbia.
That'll be linked IMHO to the possibility of full scale hybrid warfare, as proposed by the Silicon Curtain's Jonathan Fink, however, whether you go for the invasion option or the hybrid warfare option, it's plain that Russia has a number of calculations to make.
It's equally plain that neither invasion (of Ukraine) nor hybrid warfare in Europe have produced results in isolation and we're now into the fifth year of this war. It would need to be something very special to break Europe's will and invasion is more likely to galvanise Europe than split the ditherers off.
That's it. I mean, my bet is on a full scale hybrid assault. But again, they would have to be absolutely assured that that would coerce, um, you know, various countries to, to, to not assist Ukraine, to stockpile their weapons, to not retaliate. (45:43)
Russia continues to lean heavily on the information war/reflexive control with various claims, for example:
that Baltic states are allowing drone strikes from their territory on Russia
and Ukrainian drone partnerships manufacturing in Europe, which together make Europe a legitimate target for Russian forces
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu warned Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on April 16 that Moscow reserves what he described as the "right to self-defense" if Ukrainian drones strike Russia via their airspace, the Kremlin-controlled TASS news agency reported
The remarks follow a separate warning from Moscow a day earlier that European support for Ukraine's drone capabilities could bring "unpredictable consequences," accusing several countries of becoming part of Kyiv's "strategic rear."
And separately,
(former US ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer) said Moscow’s move appeared aimed at pressuring European governments and companies involved in supporting Ukraine’s defense industry.
“To be sure, the Russians are trying to intimidate those countries in Europe that are now working with Ukraine on the production of drones,” Pifer said.Analysts say the publication of the lists is part of a broader effort by Moscow to deter Western support for Ukraine.
The interview also talks about either "winning" or avoiding a "catastrophic defeat". They aren't relevant terms IMV. Even President Zelensky talks of "thwarted" and "difficult" at an operational/tactical level,
The offensive they planned for March was thwarted by the actions of our armed forces. That is why the Russians will now simply intensify their offensive operations.
- Zelenskyy 3rd April
Overall, the front line is holding... The situation is difficult, but the best in the last 10 months.
- Zelenskyy said, "citing Ukrainian and British intelligence data." (Reuters)
Both Russia and Europe have problems with people.
Russia is concerned about the likely impact of demobbed former soldiers with psychological problems and access to weapons after their experience of the 1990s, while Europe still lacks political will, cohesion and a strategy beyond supporting Ukraine for "as long as it takes"
"As more and more of them begin to be demobilised and return home, Russia will see an influx of veterans ... bearing the psychological impacts of war."
Such concerns go all the way to the top, with President Vladimir Putin viewing the prospect of an army returning en masse as a potential risk he wants carefully managed to avoid destabilising society and the political system he has built, three sources close to the Kremlin told Reuters.
The aim, one of the sources said, is to avoid a repeat of the social ructions that followed the end of the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan, when returning veterans helped fuel a wave of organised crime that blighted the 1990s.
Sources:
Youtube vids ^^
https://kyivindependent.com/russia-threatens-action-against-finland-baltic-states/
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/74100
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/heroes-villains-russia-braces-eventual-return-its-enormous-army-2025-09-09/
Does anyone take Russian threats seriously any more? So many so called red lines have been crossed
Does anyone take Russian threats seriously any more? So many so called red lines have been crossed
Wednesday is nuclear armageddon threat day as it is the 22nd of the month again already.
An interesting idea in hybrid warfare according to The Times
Russia could seize an island to test Nato at any time, warns Sweden
The country’s military chief believes the Kremlin may launch an attack in the Baltic Sea to expose divisions within the western alliance
Would western European countries respond to an article 5 request for the invasion of a potentially unoccupied island in the east of Europe?
Does anyone take Russian threats seriously any more? So many so called red lines have been crossed
They've been making threats for decades. It was certainly effective with President Biden and a decent chunk of the EU leaders since 2022
“The Russians are, let us say, fond of resorting to threats of escalation. This is a habit of the Russians going back to Soviet times,” (Former veteran US diplomat Daniel) Fried said, commenting on Moscow’s warning that increased European drone support for Ukraine makes Europe directly involved in the war."
“They’re frustrated because they cannot beat Ukraine. So they’re trying to claim that they’re fighting NATO, they’re fighting the US. They’re trying to frighten the Europeans. I don’t think it will work,” Fried said.
He added that Russia has already targeted Europe through hybrid attacks, including sabotage, but has failed to shake European resolve."
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/74187