Harrowing, unsettling, unflinchingly brilliant.

Not an easy film, but quite superb.

I’ll second that – a very good film.

It’s brilliant.

Not an easy watch though.

Remember that being mentioned on here before – cheers for the shout, will watch that. 🙂

Great film

The full statement from Coroner Andrew Walker in the Corporal Mark Wright case:

May I begin by offering once again my deepest sympathies to members of Cpl Wright’s family.

Nothing I will ever be able to say will be enough to comfort them in their grief.

Cpl Wright was an exceptional soldier amongst those rare breeds who can, and do, act with unhesitating courage in the most desperate circumstances that are faced by soldiers almost daily in Afghanistan.

The loss of Cpl Wright will, I have no doubt, be keenly felt by his family, his friends, his unit and our armed forces.

I have frequently encountered bravery and courage as I have sat here listening to the sad circumstances of many military inquests but it must not pass without comment that this exceptional soldier, who was rightly awarded the George Cross, not only organised a rescue party from the observation point at Athens following the first mine explosion but, despite being gravely injured and knowing that help was a long time away, joked and kept up the spirits of those trapped in the minefield. Cpl Wright’s last act was to reach over to check the condition of the wounded soldier placed next to him on the aircraft, only relaxing when the medic told him the injured soldier would be all right.

This selfless courage forms part of a tradition within our armed forces and Cpl Wright will continue to be an inspiration to those who follow.

That a brave soldier is lost in battle is always a matter of deep sadness but when that life is lost where it need not have been because of a lack of equipment and assets those responsible should hang their heads in shame.

This tragedy has its roots in the expectation that a small force of dedicated professional soldiers would be expected to extend the scope and number of their operations without the necessary support.

To reach the position where soldiers stationed at two important observation posts, through a shortage of radio batteries and re-chargers, had to resort to firing shots into the air to attract their colleagues’ attention to the presence of a threat simply beggars belief.

In fact the battery situation was so dire that a radio communication channel between the two outposts at Athens and Normandy that should have been open all the time could be opened for only one minute every two hours.

In my view there can be no criticism leveled to LCpl Hale, Cpl Pearson or any of those who participated in mounting this mission (the sniper patrol).

Col Tootal cannot be criticised for the action he took. As he said, he had an injured man and was desperate to do something to help.

In my judgment it was the downwash of the Chinook that was directly responsible for the explosion that injured Cpl Wright.

What was needed was a medium-frame helicopter with a winch.

The actions of the US personnel who flew into the minefield is without doubt heroism of the highest order, by the specialist rescue and recovery team.

Those who survived owe their lives to the Americans.

It is lamentable that the UK is not able to provide dedicated helicopters for the same service.

Cpl Wright died of haemorrhagic shock on his way to hospital. He would have survived if he had been taken sooner.

Narrative verdict: Cpl Mark William Wright died while on active service in Afghanistan on the sixth of September 2006 when, having an entered an area 1800m to the south west of the Kajaki Dam to rescue a soldier who had stepped on a mine, became trapped in a minefield with other soldiers.

Cpl Wright died on his way to hospital having satisfied himself that other injured soldiers were safe.

There were three factors that caused Cpl Mark Wrights death: The first, a lack of appropriate UK helicopters in Afghanistan fitted with a winch, the second was the downwash from the Chinook helicopter sent to land in the minefield and the third was the administrative delay in sending a suitable helicopter with a winch.

There was a really serious failure not to ensure that there were sufficient batteries and radio battery charges at the observation posts and this serious failure reduced the ability to communicate by radio. This was a defect in the system that contributed to the death of Cpl Mark William Wright.

There was a really serious failure not to provide meaningful information to soldiers stationed at these observation posts about the threat of mines in the areas where they were to operate and this was a defect in the system that contributed to the death of Cpl Wright.

There were failures in the teaching methods used both as part of OPTAG and in the delivery of RSOI training that resulted in the soldiers, who operated at these forward observation posts, not appreciating that the traditional training to locate and mark mines, as part of clearing a path out of a mined area, were unsuitable for the terrain at Kajaki and that training failed to take account of the technology that was available to better address the detection of mines. This was a defect in the system that contributed to the death of Cpl Wright.

There was a serious failure to make an assessment of the threat from mines at Kajaki or to take account of local knowledge of the threat from mines until a visit by an EOD expert following Cpl Wright’s death and this was a factor relevant to the circumstances of Cpl Wright’s death.

There was a serious failure on the part of those responsible for briefing the Chinook helicopter command without making reference to a mine map that indicated the presence of an area known to be mined and the pilot unknowingly planned to land his aircraft in this area. This was a factor relevant to the circumstances of Cpl Wright’s death.

There was a serious failure to meet the NATO doctrine to provide, within one hour, advanced resuscitation measures and this was a defect in the system which contributed to Cpl Wright’s death.

There was an individual failure in that the officer responsible for passing updated information about the mine threat did not understand the information set out in the maps he had been provided with and therefore he was unable to interpret these maps and this was a factor relevant to the circumstances of the death of Cpl Wright.

There was a failure to properly take account of and act on local information made available about the mine threat at the start of the occupation of the Kajaki area. This was a factor relevant to the circumstances of Cpl Wright’s death.

🙁

A bump for the evening shift.

The above is a bit of a spoiler, sadly.

Has a very authentic feel to it. Things get out of hand in a very realistic way. Excellent