People wanted to create a different world in 1945, and I feel this helps explain his election loss, seemingly at the very peak of his victory.
The Beveridge Report* was widely circulated by the Army, (I think a copy was posted to every serviceman individually ) it was a popular read (can you imagine such a thing now?), and widely discussed. When the war was over, lots of these guys came home and said "I'll have some of that, please". Atlee was popular, seen as progressive, and the campaign was largely fought over the future. Lots of folks remembered the Tories of the '30's and thought Churchill was weak domestically. It also killed the Liberal party.
* I think it concluded conclusively that Coke was better than Pepsi...Although that might have been a different beverage report (Boom, and indeed, Tish)
They cheered him but voted against him. He was still personally popular, but the Tories had lost contact with the prevailing mood of the country. Churchill was also seen as someone who might lead the country brilliantly in a war, but that wasn’t what was needed in a time of peace.
From the Battle of Britain that essentially ended the use of the Luftwaffe as an offensive weapon over the western front and at El Alamein and Malta onwards the allies never lost another significant battle against the Axis.
The Battle of Britain was in 1940. El Alamein was in 1942. The seige of Malta wasn't lifted until the end of 1942. The Allies suffered a lot of defeats in that time. Greece and Crete were lost in 1941, Germany invaded Russia in 1941, Pearl Harbor was in 1941, Singapore, Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc. were all lost in 1941-42. Dieppe was in 1942.
It wasn't until 1943 that the Allies had the Axis consistently on the defensive. Churchill's "End of the Beginning" speech was after the Second Battle of El Alamein, in late 1942. The first three years of the war saw some brutal defeats for the Allies.
.... Lots to read here. I knew you lot would have the answer! Jenkins' book arrived yesterday. It's pretty chunky...
The first three years of the war saw some brutal defeats for the Allies.
Oh sure, but broaden your horizon. War is mostly about logistics and resources. The Battle of the Atlantic is the most decisive arena of the war and by Mid 1941 (after the development of the Convoy system, and ASDEC) it's all over bar the shouting. There's only one period June 1940 -Feb 1941 ("The happy time") that the Nazi U-boat fleet come to anywhere near sinking the sorts of tonnage that they need to relentlessly in order to have an impact on Britain's war effort, and even then there's only one month in which they reach the critical levels of that, and at that peak there's still "only" 15% or so of the Merchant Fleet that's ever out of commission.
By the time the Canadian Navy has expanded, the convoy system is in place and there's effective anti-submarine technology...Mid 1941. The Germans have effectually already lost. (because they cannot replenish their attrition at the rate we can) There's some fighting still to do, and some massive reversals, (Although I'd argue the toss that the outcome of Pearl Harbour was successful for the Japanese) But it's done. It's takes the allies another year or so to get everything pointed in the same direction, and we never really looked back.
This is the point I made about the relative understanding of Germany's strengths and it's weakness as understood by Hitler and Churchill. Hitler is mad, he thinks that they're the master race and all he has to do is "make it so" Whereas Churchill, the student of history understand the nature of war, has a realistic grasp of the capability of the German military, and understands how they campaign, The "Bewegungskrieg" and "Kesselschlacht" of the Battle of France in 1940 was exactly the same campaign they waged in 1870 and 1914...Hit quickly and hard, that's what the German military is all about, what it hasn't got (and never has had) is any Strategic sense. Churchill knows all this, Hitler does not. Churchill's task in 1940 is literally "Steady the nerves..." He understands, perhaps more clearly than nearly all those around him is that given the relative strengths of the British vs the Germans in a long term continent wide strategic conflict. The odds are stacked in our favour.
Christ, what a nerd...
. War is mostly about logistics and resources
Only if you allow time for it to become attritional and even then as shown in modern conflicts there is more to it than that
The British Army at the outbreak of war was at best a curate's egg, it's inability to manoeuvre (and reluctance to stand and fight) allowed both the Germans and the Japanese to nearly take total victory
We were lucky that Germans were led by a lunatic and that both Germany and Japan were resource poor. Assigning Churchill strategic vision may be more about who wrote the history. What he did do is communicate the desire to fight and that more than anything was his contribution
I would recommend the following by James Holland. In fact I would recommend anything by James Holland as his books are very good.
The War in the West
— (2015). The War in the West - A New History, Volume 1: Germany Ascendant 1939-1941. London: Corgi. ISBN 978-0552169202.
— (2017). The War in the West - A New History, Volume 2: The Allies Fight Back 1941-43. London: Corgi. ISBN 978-0802125606.
Not specifically a Churchill biography, but he is in it.
The Battle of the Atlantic is the most decisive arena of the war and by Mid 1941 (after the development of the Convoy system, and ASDEC) it’s all over bar the shouting.
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems inevitable that the Allies would win due to the overwhelming industrial advantage, but in mid-1940, the situation was extremely dire and it was not inevitable by any means. It was still dire in mid-1942 - Singapore and Malaya had been lost, along with the Philippines and Indonesia. Churchill's leadership was important in persuading Britain and the Empire to keep fighting.
Has anyone read Andrew Roberts's biography of him? This thread piqued my interest in finding put more about Churchill - I loved Roberts's The Storm Of War, but the Churchill bio sounded a bit... one-sided and focused on the positive?
If anyone can tell me it's balanced, I'll have it. 🙂
it’s inability to manoeuvre (and reluctance to stand and fight)
While the British Army was, at outbreak of war, nowhere near as effective as it would become, this is a harsh assessment. the BEF was almost all mechanised, something both the German Infantry (mostly horse-drawn) and the French (mostly completely static or foot) lacked. and they're not reluctant to stand and fight either, see 2 corps led by Alan Brooke, at the Ypres-Comine canal, and the 2nd BEF campaign that was landed in France on the 6th June (admittedly mostly a political gesture, but still...)
Only if you allow time for it to become attritional
But as soon as the Germans invaded most of Western Europe and then stayed there...How else was the war going to develop? This is the point i made about the Germans lacking a Strategic purpose, Hitler tries to use the Wehrmacht in a way it's never been used before, and they have no history of it, no in built knowledge of how to do it. The British on the other hand are vastly experienced in Strategic goals...
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems inevitable that the Allies would win due to the overwhelming industrial advantage, but in mid-1940, the situation was extremely dire and it was not inevitable by any means
Oh sure of course, anything could've happened, but the point is that Churchill at that time had a pretty good insight into their relative strengths, and he was gambling with a pretty strong hand.
Some good insights here, especially on the importance of logistics - this is what did for the Germans in numerous campaigns, North Africa, Russia. Crazy thing about Russia is that the Germans had studied in detail Napoleons defeat there, but then found themselves in exactly the same situation. Again, going back to Alanbrooke it seems clear that Churchill was not gifted strategically - that really wasn’t his forte, and his chiefs of staff had to talk him out of numerous madcap schemes (including an obsession with invading Norway).
An interesting snippet from his own history of WW2 is his reaction to Pearl Harbour, and his view that from that point on he never really doubted the allies would win, it was just a matter of how long it would take.
Can’t remember what I was reading recently about the Far East, but Dan Carlin is very good on this stuff too. General consensus seems to be that the Japanese never had any doubts they could not win, but their strategy was to gain lots of territory, then negotiate a peace which allowed them to keep most of it.
General consensus seems to be that the Japanese never had any doubts they could not win, but their strategy was to gain lots of territory, then negotiate a peace which allowed them to keep most of it.
The problem with Japan is that their leaders had little understanding of the United States and Japanese culture is very vulnerable to groupthink because underlings are discouraged from disagreeing with their seniors. The Japanese people who had been to the U.S. warned that American industrial capacity was so overwhelming that Japan could not win. Unfortunately, Japanese militarists had a highly inflated sense of Japanese spiritual superiority and believed that Americans were weak and would negotiate a ceasefire. The Japanese army pushed for the invasion of China (land war), while the navy wanted a naval war. The army manipulated events and got their land war in China, but the U.S. imposed economic sanctions, which left the Japanese leaders a choice between a humiliating back down or a full-blown war.
I don't think the Japanese leadership understood how much the Pearl Harbor attack angered the U.S. public. They did not declare war until after the attack occurred, but later claimed that they just made a mistake with the timing and it wasn't a deliberate surprise attack. Instead of leaving America demoralized, the American public realized they were in a fight to the death and, after Pearl Harbor, they would not have accepted anything other than unconditional surrender by the Axis powers.
What really destroyed Japan was the U.S. navy submarine blockade. Japan needed merchant ships to transport oil, rubber, minerals, etc. back from Indonesia and Malaysia, but American submarines pretty much entirely wiped out the Japanese merchant fleet. By 1945, Japan had pretty much no industrial capacity because the supply of raw materials had been cut off. The planes and ships they had left had almost no fuel and they were basically planning on arming school children with pointy sticks in order to fight the expected invasion.
But, even after all that, the hard-core military leaders still believed that Americans were weak and would crumble in the face of Japanese fighting spirit. Utterly deluded. They deserved to be hung for how they wasted the lives of millions of Japanese people, let alone the atrocities they inflicted on the other Asian countries.
What really destroyed Japan was the U.S. navy submarine blockade
Yes! A few thousand sailors of the US Pacific Fleet did more damage than almost everything else combined. Like the 14th Army, almost completely forgotten post war
Logistics again y’see. Every....single....time!
they would not have accepted anything other than unconditional surrender
Yes, interesting that the US (through deciphered code) knew that by early 1943 the Japanese were putting out the feelers in embassies in Sweden and I think Switzerland also, that they wanted to talk about surrender, but with the caveat that the Emperor must remain at the head of the Govt. the US ambassadors were told in no uncertain terms that they mustn't open dialogue, such was the strength of feeling.
While the British Army was, at outbreak of war, nowhere near as effective as it would become, this is a harsh assessment. the BEF was almost all mechanised, something both the German Infantry (mostly horse-drawn) and the French (mostly completely static or foot) lacked. and they’re not reluctant to stand and fight either, see 2 corps led by Alan Brooke, at the Ypres-Comine canal, and the 2nd BEF campaign that was landed in France on the 6th June (admittedly mostly a political gesture, but still…)
The stands were in the context of a flight to evacuation, not stand, hold, manoeuvre, attack, defeat the British Army perfected the withdrawal in WW1 Gallipoli the best example.
Hitler gave up the initiative when he stopped outside Dunkirk, he repeated the mistake by not invading nearly immediately before the big British war machine could sort itself out. The fact that the Germans relied so heavily on horses just adds insult to injury
But as soon as the Germans invaded most of Western Europe and then stayed there…How else was the war going to develop?
If they had taken Britain they would have had a far simpler time and the opportunity to start rolling up the empire if they had wished. You dismiss the reality that that the logistical capabilities of empire coalesced in Britain, removing that capability and completing the occupation of western Europe would have made things considerably different
How long would it have lasted who knows, but your paradigm of the excellence of British strategic vision seems ever so slightly rose tinted
Hitler gave up the initiative when he stopped outside Dunkirk, he repeated the mistake by not invading nearly immediately before the big British war machine could sort itself out. The fact that the Germans relied so heavily on horses just adds insult to injury
Hitler miscalculated in invading Poland. He didn't believe France and Britain would go to war, so Germany wasn't fully prepared for a long war. Germany simply didn't have the ability to launch an invasion of Britain. An invasion fleet would have been met with everything Britain had to throw at it. The German navy was a fraction of the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe failed to gain air supremacy, so the Royal Navy would have devastated any invasion fleet. The RN would have suffered massive losses from air attack, but the German invasion force would have been utterly routed.
your paradigm of the excellence of British strategic vision seems ever so slightly rose tinted
Britain had the strategic vision of putting a huge moat between itself and potential attackers. That's why the speech went, "We will fight on the beaches...", not, "We will fight at the border crossings..." Strategy is much easier when you have a sea separating you from your enemies.
The RN would have suffered massive losses from air attack,
probably not that badly, luftwaffe in 1940 had no torpedo bomber of any description or no armour piecing bombs capable of penetrating the deck armour of the RN capital ships. They were also pretty poor at hitting fast moving destroyer types. And given the Kriegsmarine had no capital ships worthy of the name and submarine operation in fleet actions have never gone particularly well (battle fleets run at 25knots+ not the 12 or so of convoys) its difficult to see how they could really hurt the RN.
The fact that the Germans relied so heavily on horses just adds insult to injury
@thols2 sums up so neatly, he's just left me with this nugget. Politically the French were all over the place and the Army and the Government pretty much weren't on the same page, and fell for the German propaganda of the panzer shock-troops, plus intelligence reports from the French Air Force of the Wehrmacht massing on roads into the Ardennes were dismissed as fanciful (as were intercepted transmission through Switzerland saying the same thing). The BEF to be fair to them, did their best given that they were under the (woeful) French command, and when extricated from that, gave a bloody good account of themselves. In fact enough of an account of themselves to enable the evacuation to start (halt order notwithstanding) When Milch overflew the beaches after the evacuation he asked where all the bodies were, when told about what had happened, he wrote in his diary later "That's it, we're screwed* "
* for brevity
For what it's worth, I don't have a particularly rosy view of "British Excellence" or supremacy, the Japanese totally played a blinder at Singapore for instance, and as @thol2 has said (and I agree) it was a pretty close run thing for a while, We were dealt a better hand, and played it well...
massing on roads into the Ardennes
It was believed the forest would be an adequate defense. The French & BEF had a long border to defend, the Germans just had to break through in one area.
Whilst they only had to break through in one area, they in fact broke through in several and not just in the Ardennes. They also attacked in the Somme, Aisne and Alsace-Lorraine. Various points along the Maginot line were encirled and put out of action.
The BEF to be fair to them, did their best given that they were under the (woeful) French command
There's little to suggest that the command of either the French or BEF was woeful and your accounts sometimes put personal appreciations above historical accuracy, nickc. I think you need to give some crdit to the Gemran generals and accept that even with hindsight and command of both French and BEF forces you wouldn't have changed the débâcle into a victory.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Expeditionary_Force_(World_War_II)
Churchill, let’s look at some other achievements.
Come out ye black and tans, come out and fight me like a man
Show your wife how you won medals down in Flanders
Tell her how the IRA made you run like hell away
From the green and lovely lanes of Killashandra
There’s little to suggest that the command of either the French was woeful
No, there's loads, as it mostly was. Gemilan was too old (he was 68), and too inflexible, his excuse after the war when asked by Churchill why he didn't counter attack against the German Bulge was the now infamous quote "inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of methods". Petain thought the Ardennes impenetrable, even De Gaulle's efforts against the 7th Fliegerkorps was stunted and was no more than a local penetration. Loads of the French Field commanders were way too old, and reliant on static defence like the Maginot, Ardennes and River Meuse Some of the French units were too new (had seen little or no training, let alone action) and some of the reserves of B Divison were too old with an average age of over 30.
Raynauld (French PM) was telephoning the British on the 15th May declaiming "We are Beaten, we have lost" Remember that Alan Brooke landed the 2nd BEF on the 6th of June! (2 days after the Dunkirk evacuation)
It's really ****ing irritiating when people modify a text before quoting it, I said:
There’s little to suggest that the command of either the French or BEF was woeful
Joe Biden is 78, Churchill was 66, only two years younger than the too old French general Gamelin.
You need to link a quote for Petain because he's often quoted as saying the defeat was inevitable rather than the Ardennes were impenetrable (and as already stated the Germans broke through in many places outside the Ardennes).
When they weren't too old they were too young, nickc. You're just rewriting history to your taste, it's worse than Inglorious Basterds. The more you write the more anti-French fantasy you write in. Less of the xenophobic horse shit please.
The more you write the more anti-French fantasy you write in. Less of the xenophobic horse shit please.
Nothing I’ve written about the French Army's defeat in 1940 is controversial here Edukator, it’s all standard textbook. might not fit your view, but that’s not really important. A simple test here then is: You tell me why the Wehrmacht defeats what was widely regarded at the time as the most significantly powerful army in Europe? The OKW expected the Battle for France to last months, and costs them hundreds of thousands of troops, If the leadership of the French Army wasn't as bad as it was, explain why they lost so quickly and heavily....
I’m not anti French any more than you are. If you can’t contribute without insults, I’d suggest you lay off the forum until you can?
The problem with Japan is that their leaders had little understanding of the United States and Japanese culture is very vulnerable to groupthink because underlings are discouraged from disagreeing with their seniors.
I am not sure thats correct. Japan had serious issues with junior officers putting pressure on more senior officers and officials. As a couple of examples it is unclear whether the Manchurian incident was forced by lower ranking officers and for completely clear then there the March and October incidents set a clear precedence.
Some of the Japanese leadership certainly knew what they were getting into but gambled it would work. If they backed down then their lives were on the line anyway so why not go all out?
When they weren’t too old they were too young, nickc. You’re just rewriting history to your taste, it’s worse than Inglorious Basterds. The more you write the more anti-French fantasy you write in. Less of the xenophobic horse shit please.
Seriously, have you read any of the histories of the French campaign? I would have said the ineptitude and defeatism of the French command is extremely well attested and uncontroversial.
I would have said the ineptitude and defeatism of the French command
...And I'm pretty nationally indifferent when it comes to bad commanders, One just need to look at what Montgomery and Cunningham achieved with pretty much the same group of men and equipment against Rommel compared to how Auchinleck (and his sub-ordinates) and Wavell had got on.
Mark Clarke should be rightly criticized for his actions in essentially diverting forces and allowing the Germans to slip away as he was fixated on getting to Rome, and Patton for that matter was in the opinions of many historians a bit of a "wrong-un"
Logistics again y’see. Every….single….time!
Er... Vietnam?
Before renting a room off a bunch of Polish guys I never knew about Churchill sending the majority of the Free Polish Army ‘back home’ to Stalin at the end of WWII. Not one of Britain’s finest hours.
I also had enough relatives in South Yorkshire who were dyed in the wool tories but still had some pretty choice views of his handling of the General Strike.
Ok Vietnam - Ho Chi Minh Trail and the inability of the Americans to disrupt the North Vietnamese supply lines was a major factor in that war. Yes the Americans had access to whatever they wanted in material terms, but as in Iraq and Afghan they lacked the ability to take and hold on to ground (and in fact there was little purpose in doing so anyway).
I’m not saying logistics is the ONLY factor in warfare but it is a major factor in winning battles. The yanks won an awful lot of battles in Vietnam but still lost the war...
This is a long way from the OPs question, but still very interesting!
Er… Vietnam?
Er... Ho Chi Minh Trail.
A logistics triumph, the bombing of which caused considerable political problems for the US.
Churchill sending the majority of the Free Polish Army ‘back home’ to Stalin at the end of WWII. Not one of Britain’s finest hours.
many couldn't go home, General Sosabowski (commander of the Polish paratroopers at Arnhem), ended up as a factory worker at the end of the war, pretty much unrecognized for his efforts. agreed though, Churchill's ( including Montgomery) actions coercing the Polish into "co-operating" with Stalin else lose Britain's support, were pretty disgusting.
