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@Nicko74 - Indeed.. I don't have anything booked currently but do fly quite a bit and had an honest discussion with sweamrs this morning about choosing planes and the like.
Fingers being pointed... at Trumpington!
US has grounded them now also.
There was an American airlines captain on R4 morning. He said that AA had installed additional angle of attack indicators, as the AA pilots didn't like not having one/enough, and they early on worked out that they needed to know how to switch off some system that is now suspect - and trained pilots to do so.
IANAP.
The plane may have been averaging inputs for those few seconds, but it didn’t fly itself into the sea.
In the transcript, there was one bloke pulling back on the stick the whole time. At 10000ft the pilot tried to drop the nose to level the wings and regain some speed but the other bloke was still pulling back on the stick.
Because it was in dual input mode it averaged those inputs...
The pilot had over 1min 30s to arrest the descent. It was only after this minute and a half that the bloke admitted he'd been pulling on the stick the whole time. By then, they were too low and even though blokie then relinquished control and the pilot tried to dive, blokie then started pulling back again.
So, while that wasn't the main part of the incident the crash could probably have been averted if the captain had been in full control for the 90secs he had when he thought he was dropping the nose at 10,000ft.
A sad tale, whatever the cause!
Not sure of the truth of this but...
Also was fascinated to read that type certification is largely grandfathered (back to the original 737?), and that training onto the new aircraft could involve as little as an hours work on an iPad.
I'm not a pilot, those who are can explain the ins and outs/why's and wherefores, but to the layman it does sound a bit light on training.
Report from CNN, here’s one quote; “Other pilot complaints from the federal database include a report saying it is "unconscionable" that Boeing, the US aviation regulatory agency (the Federal Aviation Administration) and the unnamed airline would have pilots flying without adequate training or sufficient documentation.
The same entry also charges that the flight manual "is inadequate and almost criminally insufficient."
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/pilot-complaints-boeing-737-max/
Aircraft manufacturers release new aircraft then spend the next X amount of years fixing all the faults.
So no different to the MTB industry.
I flew the 2/3/4/5 variants of the 737s and they were great aircraft.
I just wonder if Boeing have developed it a step too far in an attempt to compete with Airbus and their relatively modern a320 series.
And yes, the iPad training does sound suspiciously light.
The training package for the new Airbus 320 NEO was an iBook and a quiz.
Not mandated by FAA
but I smell a lawsuit coming?
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-features-charge.html
so it turns out that the bit of software that moderates the behaviour of the anti-stall systems has always been available - it's just a 'cost option' that not all airlines opted for.
Can we have in flight safety?
*reverse whistle* Gonna cost you mate.
Oh, ok we'll do without then.
Not a good look for anyone involved.
it’s just a ‘cost option’ that not all airlines opted for.
I thought it didnt actually moderate it but could be used to see there was a problem with the input into the system. However since Boeing had forgot to mention the new functionality it isnt unreasonable to not consider it an important feature.
Not mandated by FAA
Some slightly disturbing reading around how Boeing basically has self-certified its planes and the FAA has (it is suggested) gone "great, ta".
Looks like yes, would tell pilots what the problem was.
Boeing’s optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another.
Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes, according to a person familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they have not been made public. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy.
Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded.
“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”
The training package for the new Airbus 320 NEO was an iBook and a quiz.
NEO changed the engines (duh) to reduce noise and increase fuel efficiency, tweaked the wings, but had exactly the same cockpit. In theory, the pilot shouldn't notice whether they are flying a NEO or not. EASA and FAA fully certified the changes.
737 max changed the cockpit to add an automatic trim adjustment that could crash the plane without building in proper redundant operation or pilot warning as standard (indicator light and AOA display were taken by the lead customer and are likely to become mandatory). They also managed to get the FAA to let Boeing sign it off as being "just another 737".
There’s lots of changes with an A320 NEO. Different quick reaction drills, new flight modes to name but a few. It looks he same, but has lots of different features. PS - I’m qualified on it! The 737 NG to Max changes are of a similar magnitude - apart from this bonkers stall issue.
But the way in which a 320NEO flys is VERY similar to a 320CEO, right?
The aircraft CG is similar, the aerodynamic envelope is similar enough to not require the aviation equivalent of stability control and so on.
Boeing had similar stability and structural problems on the 747-8 during certification which resulted in a qualification without the trim tanks in the tail.
The way the 737 Max flies is very similar to the NG too. The FBW computers see to it, right up to the stall, where the thrust vectors of the new engine position create problems, necessitating the MCAS system (Automatic, so still no different to fly)
This is all a bit pointless. What I’m trying to say, is that both Boeing & Airbus have produced absolute bare minimum training packages for the new aircraft. You can jump in a Neo/Max to fly it from previous CEO/NG variants without any flight/simulator training. Which is wrong.
Plus - Daffy - the A320 is pure Fly By Wire. There is no trim, and the pilot control inputs are interpreted by the computers into rates of roll, and “g” inputs in pitch. It’s in full traction control the whole time!!
Well you can't compare the Boeing and airbus philosophies. Airbus cockpits are much more common and they've programmed the aircraft all to fly like an A320...including the larger wide body jets. The cockpit layouts are extremely similar and the systems are too meaning minimal training between the aircraft (a few days instead of a couple of weeks). It's been proven to be extremely safe and has actually significantly increased aircraft safety over the years, as has the Boeing system too - so claims training is somehow lax are completely unfounded and not backed up by any facts. And in anycase it's not Boeing who stipulates training requirements, it's the airworthiness authorities. They will design their aircraft in a way to minimise training burden between different aircraft in accordance with the airworthiness requirements, but they can't just make this stuff up. It has to comply with airworthiness requirements, and pilots have to be certified under airworthiness authorities.
Also 737 is not fly by wire - well not on the main control surfaces at least...so they don't have anywhere near the integration and similar flight handling characteristics between aircraft types as Airbus do apart from the fact they're similar aircraft. The MAX does have different thrust line due to grandfather rights preventing Boeing from re-designing the undercarriage meaning engines had to be re-positioned, which in turn meant the MCAS system had to be introduced. No reason why it shouldn't be perfectly safe - aircraft have had anit-stall features on them forever like stick pushers (which is basically what MCAS is in principle) as fitted to BAE 146's and many other aircraft over the decades, and we await the final conclusions of the investigation to see if pilot training (or lack of) was a factor....or if it was a problem with the MCAS system, or the procedure pilots were trained to fly in the event the aircraft approached stall etc. We just don't know...the investigation is in lockdown so everything you read is speculation and guessing. Just because Boeing has announced software changes doesn't confirm that it has been concluded there is a problem with MCAS..it could be interim additional safety protocol being added rather than fixing an issue.
Some slightly disturbing reading around how Boeing basically has self-certified its planes and the FAA has (it is suggested) gone “great, ta”.
Well don't be disconcerted because it's BS. It could be a factor in this is the FAA airworthiness requirements weren't stringent enough but that's different. Firstly Boeing have to actually demonstrate to the FAA the aircraft is safe through thousands of hours of rigorous testing - both in flight, in simulators on rig tests etc. It costs billions. The FAA are no push-overs. The airworthiness authorities do work closely with the manufacturers...they have to understand the technology in order to determine what needs to be done to certify them. After all often they're dealing with novel and new technology. And even if the FAA have been lenient then EASA and individual countries airworthiness authorities are not so 'in-bed' with Boeing as the FAA has been accused of, and are unlikely to have been so easily persuaded to have certified an unsafe aircraft design.
Let's wait and see what facts emerge. I suspect there will be additional safety protocols added to the MCAS (probably just as much to reassure the public than anything) and additional pilot training requirements as a minimum and the MAX will go on to have a safety record as good if not better than any previous generation of 737 or any other aircraft.
The training package for the new Airbus 320 NEO was an iBook and a quiz.
Well, yes, but the Neo flies like any other A320. Bits that did change - rotation law for example - were well explained in the (company) iBook and the FCOM.
Airbus genuinely love adding new toys to their aircraft. They’ve pioneered AP/FD TCAS, runway overrun protection, take-off performance monitoring etc etc. Nothing goes through wind shear like an Airbus.
It’s not the flying bodge job that the 737 series has become. Because the 737 is a crock of shit, and because they’re desperate for fleet commonality, modern aircraft like the 787 drag on these sticking plasters and maintain a higher level of risk than just designing the flaws out in the first place. There are countless ways a 787 will turn around and bite you and they could all have been fixed before production.
Eg...
Google the “FLCH trap”.
Auto-thrust that doesn’t disconnect during a rejected take-off.
Thrust reversers that will deploy in the air.
Flight directors that switch off about 45 seconds into a go-around.
Battery fires.
Dual engine failures on the landing roll.
Computer hangovers in flight that silently load and activate yesterday’s flight plan.
Uncommanded changes to selected altitudes.
The same identical bing-bong sound effect for everything from the doorbell to ATC sending a clearance.
etc etc.
It’s my view that this is poor design coupled with lax oversight and was an accident waiting to happen. You don’t buy American cars for their reliability.
I must admit I’ve never flown the 737 - just the 777. The latest 737 variants sound like a bit of a nightmare.
A lengthy but comprehensive report here if anyone's interested.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view
Because the 737 is a crock of shit
Stopped reading there. You were doing well.
Google the “FLCH trap”.
Auto-thrust that doesn’t disconnect during a rejected take-off.
Thrust reversers that will deploy in the air.
Flight directors that switch off about 45 seconds into a go-around.
Battery fires.
Dual engine failures on the landing roll.
Computer hangovers in flight that silently load and activate yesterday’s flight plan.
Uncommanded changes to selected altitudes.
The same identical bing-bong sound effect for everything from the doorbell to ATC sending a clearance.
etc etc.It’s my view that this is poor design coupled with lax oversight and was an accident waiting to happen. You don’t buy American cars for their reliability.
As if there weren't enough reasons to avoid Ryan Air...
As if there weren’t enough reasons to avoid Ryan Air…
Tell us about their safety record then?.... And I'm pretty sure they don't have any 787's.
Stopped reading there. You were doing well.
You do know that that's one of our resident commercial pilots, don't you?
You do know that that’s one of our resident commercial pilots, don’t you?
Yes. Which is why I stopped reading. I expect a bit better from someone in his position. The 737 is a very successful aircraft, to call it a 'crock of shit' is poor. In my opinion. I'm really into aviation and some of the discussions have been very interesting. But also lots of assumptions.
That report is excellent
That no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 MAX
seems to have even raised the issue of using multiple inputs,
including the opposite angle of attack sensor, in thecomputer’s determination of an impending stall is mind-
blowing. As a lifetime member of the software developmentfraternity, I don’t know what toxic combination of
inexperience, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding led to
this.
I can't understand that at all. Even when I was writing software just for X-ray machines I would have routines that check that the inputs are sane in various ways and that would have involved checking copies of the same signal where available and it was plainly obvious that you needed to do that. That software is no-where near as serious as the MCAS software. As it says in the report, I would be scared to rely on the same people who wrote the original software to be able to deliver a solution as it is a cultural issue as much as a coding one
Can we all just take a moment to celebrate what a powerful tool the internet has become :
You do know that that’s one of our resident commercial pilots, don’t you?
Yes. Which is why I stopped reading. I expect a bit better from someone in his position. The 737 is a very successful aircraft, to call it a ‘crock of shit’ is poor. In my opinion. I’m really into aviation and some of the discussions have been very interesting. But also lots of assumptions
crock of shit’
Possibly an exaggeration. But not by much, I think. The 737 of today is - somewhat confusingly - both unchanged and yet completely different from the first one that flew getting on for 50 years ago. Changed thanks to new technology yet according to Boeing similar enough that they maintain the same certification.
The tail clearance on longer models isn't sufficient so approach speeds are higher. Controls are still pulleys and string, with hydraulic assistance but servo tabs as the ultimate backstop. The overhead panel is still the same shotgun approach to ergonomics as the original. Cabin pressurisation still requires pilot intervention. Generators need to be manually connected to the network. Bleed management isn't automatic. Flight envelope protection is minimal.
There is an appalling pitch-power couple. The flight deck is cramped and uncomfortable. The caution and warning system isn't integrated. Many flight management capabilities that make the pilot's job easier (and free up capacity, hence safer) are software add-ons.
It's a very basic aircraft, ultimately. One of the reasons it's like this is because Boeing's biggest customers are opposed to change. Southwest used to have their 737-NGs mirror the analogue displays of their older aircraft to avoid crew training expenses. IMHO - and it is only an opinion, which I believe I'm entitled to - is that that MAX should have been redesigned from scratch, implementing the technology developed on the 787. Instead we got an old design modified in what appears to be a hurry owing to commercial pressure from competitors.
The A320 series is 30 years old. You know how it reacts to an out-of-range angle of attack measurement? It votes it out of the computations and downgrades the landing capability slightly.
Can we all just take a moment to celebrate what a powerful tool the internet has become :
You do know that that’s one of our resident commercial pilots, don’t you?
Yes. Which is why I stopped reading. I expect a bit better from someone in his position. The 737 is a very successful aircraft, to call it a ‘crock of shit’ is poor. In my opinion. I’m really into aviation and some of the discussions have been very interesting. But also lots of assumptions
What are you trying to say?
Really interesting post flaperon.
"The A320 series is 30 years old. You know how it reacts to an out-of-range angle of attack measurement? It votes it out of the computations and downgrades the landing capability slightly."
What are you trying to say?
I read it that he's pointing out the laughable juxtaposition of someone basically rubbishing a commercial pilots opinion, cos he's read a bit about planes n that, online.
Could be wrong though. 😁
PPRuNe has been very insightful. Plenty of 737 pilots commenting there if anyone wants to wade through the thread.
https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/619272-ethiopian-airliner-down-africa-122.html
I have a few mates who are transport safety investigators. They won't get on one. So that's good enough for me.
“The A320 series is 30 years old. You know how it reacts to an out-of-range angle of attack measurement? It votes it out of the computations and downgrades the landing capability slightly.”
D-AIDP
This OEB covered the case where two AoA probes give incorrect measurements at the same time, and can lead to an uncontrollable pitch down moment.
A single AoA probe failure, however, is usually a non-event. If there is any doubt (IE the single measurement seems plausible and the voted measurement suspicious), the aircraft disables the protections and hands the decision to the pilot.
I read it that he’s pointing out the laughable juxtaposition of someone basically rubbishing a commercial pilots opinion, cos he’s read a bit about planes n that, online.
You get all kinds of experts on here. I remember one big hitter trying to explain the shoreham crash when it happened..his experience on the subject..he had flow model planes in the past.
What are you trying to say?
I read it that he’s pointing out the laughable juxtaposition of someone basically rubbishing a commercial pilots opinion, cos he’s read a bit about planes n that, online.
Well, another problem with the internet. Misunderstanding what is being said. I was only having an issue with his choice of wording, the way he was making his point. Absolutely nothing else. I'm certainly not trying to say he is wrong or that I know better.
Boeing to hold a briefing on Wednesday…(linky)
Any chance they'll resolve the conveyor belt question while they're at it?
It’s a very basic aircraft, ultimately. One of the reasons it’s like this is because Boeing’s biggest customers are opposed to change.
I guess that is the biggest driver of the MAX project. Enlightening post anyway - thanks. I've worked briefly on a couple of Boeing systems and it chimes with my experience.
Are you currently on Airbus types? (I'm not trying to imply bias! just interested)
Are you currently on Airbus types? (I’m not trying to imply bias! just interested)
No. 5000 hours on the A320 series but been flying the 787 for a couple of years now.
Jesus, that's some range!
I remember one big hitter trying to explain the shoreham crash when it happened..his experience on the subject..he had flow model planes in the past.
A bit OT, but, just for shoots and giggles, I had a quick search through the shoreham thread, amusingly enough, your big hitter called it as pilot error... much like the AAIB report.
a little snippet part way thru ^^^^ linked article
"FAA declined to comment on the European document. A trim-related “equivalent level of safety” (ELOS) memorandum listed in its 737 MAX certification document is not available on the FAA website. The agency declined to provide it to Reuters."
from the FAA "Equivalent level of safety (ELOS) findings are granted when literal compliance with a certification regulation cannot be shown and compensating factors exist which can provide an ELOS .......... Compensating factors are normally any design changes, limitations, or equipment imposed that will facilitate granting the equivalency."
Can you please translate that to plain English for us lesser mortals?
my translation but suspect others better qualified....
The FAA signed off an exception related to "trim" on the 737 max - the documentation covering this should probably be available on line but isn't and either its so dull no one would be interested or its a very interesting read and hence declining to give Reuters a copy
Only skimmed this on my phone but I'm not convinced it's that relevant. Even before MCAS the 737 has unusual behaviour with trimming at low speeds where the aircraft may silently trim against the pilot to increase control loading at low speeds (not a 737 pilot, just passing on anecdote from a colleague).
It wouldn't be unusual to find electric trim input inhibited at very low speeds, as it would ensure that releasing the controls introduces a natural pitch down moment.
not a pilot but thought that trim was the issue - maybe not in what i would think of as the conventional sense - that is just something that maintains control position but the automated (and unexpected) input of substantial trim to reduce the angle of attack if a stall is predicted
hols2 linked to what a pleb thought was a useful article.... https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/
to paraphrase (cos' article won't cut and paste) MCAS's sole function is to trim the stabilizer nose down
IANAP, or flown model planes though I can make paper ones...
This thread is a really interesting read... My partner heads up a software testing function and she said that the testing community were putting a lot of time and interest into this.... but to me, it does sound like Boeing's passengers are paying for the Beta testing which should have really been done beforehand... (IANAST either...).
Well, another problem with the internet. Misunderstanding what is being said. I was only having an issue with his choice of wording, the way he was making his point. Absolutely nothing else. I’m certainly not trying to say he is wrong or that I know better.
That’s certainly not the way it came across - it appeared that your criticism of a commercial pilot’s opinion was based on the fact that you’d read a bit about flying aircraft.
Can only assume that Boeing are a new aircraft company and still learning the basics: https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/boeing-737-max-fuel-tanks-a9343581.html
They seem an absolute shower of ****.
So they've found stuff in the fuel tanks of brand new aircraft - one would assume that this means there's a reasonable chance that there might be some stuff in the fuel tanks of the planes that are currently grounded all aver the world. Will Boeing now have to pay to have all those planes checked also?
They must be the most untrustworthy plane manufacturer out there at the moment (and their space division is no better either!)
It's a grim reminder that no matter how big a company is, they can't be allowed to certify their own work.
The FAA should take as much of the blame as Boeing; letting them get away with obviously lax quality standards for so long is a serious lapse of an oversight body.
I struggle to believe this sort of thing will be confined to the 737 Max. What is to stop crap gathering in the tanks of all the other Boeing products? And worse.
Not unusual to find stuff in fuel tanks of aircraft. Bits of rivets and bolts, swarf. All sorts of detritus left over from original production and stuff that gathers during service through maintenance. Things are alot better now with alot of focus on clearing up, but there will still be some stuff in there. The fuel systems are designed to be tolerant of this stuff as it is anticipated in the design that there will be this rubbish rattling around in the fuel tanks. It's impossible to completely clear out the tanks on production. By the time the tanks have been fitted out there is no way you can get into some area's again to clear out the stuff.
The reality is it's all small stuff and not alot of it and completely benign and safe, but doesn't sound good to the average bod on the street. Everyone is triggered around news about Boeing right now. Normally this would be non-news, but it gets out in the context of the MAX and the media jump on it.
Yet the 737 GM is involved and "Boeing said it immediately made corrections in its production system to prevent a recurrence". Why would the bother changing process for something that's already taken into account and completely benign?
About 5 years ago I went to a talk about HSTs coming into service on the Western Region.
"So I climbed up into the fuel tank, a filthy box slung underneath which gleamed inside. It was quite psychedelic to be honest, plus with the diesel fumes. Anyway I started to look for anything which might have been causing the engine to cut out. We'd taken everything else to pieces and checked it all twice; the fuel tank was literally the last place we expected to find anything, but there in the corner was a packet of sandwiches that someone must have lost back in Derby. It had been washing up against the outlet causing the fuel pressure to drop and the engine to shut down.
"43020 Damien was renamed Mother's Pride."
Why would the bother changing process for something that’s already taken into account and completely benign?
to close the story down. It's much easier than explaining that it's ok for McMoonters tool to be slapping around inside your fuel tank
Yet the 737 GM is involved and “Boeing said it immediately made corrections in its production system to prevent a recurrence”. Why would the bother changing process for something that’s already taken into account and completely benign?
Because nothing is ever perfect.
You probably think your driving is "safe". Doesn't mean that an article on Saccadic masking or the Duch reach around isn't a worthwhile read to improve it from "unlikely to have an accident" to "incrementally even less likely to have an accident".
So it depends whether someone at Boeing thinks that the amount of rubbish in the tanks is more or less than what the strainer / filter can deal with. Assuming less, then no problem, carry on as normal, but best give future ones an extra check to get from "safe enough" to "a bit safer than safe enough" if it's no extra cost. There's also the issue of distribution curves (where 6-sigma gets its name from), if there's a bit of dirt in one, there's more in another, if you work on getting them all a bit cleaner then the worst ones are less likely to be above the threshold where it becomes a problem.
to close the story down
So we’re saying they’re telling big porky pies?
if it’s no extra cost.
Extra checks can’t come for free if they’re extra.
Doing extra work is one of the 7 wastes, and not something you do if you’re confident in your work
I haven't worn a mask?