@Nicko74 – Indeed.. I don’t have anything booked currently but do fly quite a bit and had an honest discussion with sweamrs this morning about choosing planes and the like.

Fingers being pointed… at Trumpington!

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/boeing-737-trump-airplane-crash-government-shutdown-ethiopian-airlines-tweet-a8820991.html?utm_source=reddit.com

US has grounded them now also.

There was an American airlines captain on R4 morning. He said that AA had installed additional angle of attack indicators, as the AA pilots didn’t like not having one/enough, and they early on worked out that they needed to know how to switch off some system that is now suspect – and trained pilots to do so.

IANAP.

The plane may have been averaging inputs for those few seconds, but it didn’t fly itself into the sea.

In the transcript, there was one bloke pulling back on the stick the whole time. At 10000ft the pilot tried to drop the nose to level the wings and regain some speed but the other bloke was still pulling back on the stick.
Because it was in dual input mode it averaged those inputs…

The pilot had over 1min 30s to arrest the descent. It was only after this minute and a half that the bloke admitted he’d been pulling on the stick the whole time. By then, they were too low and even though blokie then relinquished control and the pilot tried to dive, blokie then started pulling back again.

So, while that wasn’t the main part of the incident the crash could probably have been averted if the captain had been in full control for the 90secs he had when he thought he was dropping the nose at 10,000ft.

A sad tale, whatever the cause!

Not sure of the truth of this but…

i won’t try to summarise or add speculation to rumour, you can read that thread yourselves, but it certainly sounds as though Boeing have created a bit of a monster with this variant. One little detail, though … apparently the switches to disconnect the MCAS auto-trim system are the only ones to operate with “Up for Off”, unlike every single other switch on Boeing aircraft!

Also was fascinated to read that type certification is largely grandfathered (back to the original 737?), and that training onto the new aircraft could involve as little as an hours work on an iPad.

I’m not a pilot, those who are can explain the ins and outs/why’s and wherefores, but to the layman it does sound a bit light on training.

Report from CNN, here’s one quote; “Other pilot complaints from the federal database include a report saying it is “unconscionable” that Boeing, the US aviation regulatory agency (the Federal Aviation Administration) and the unnamed airline would have pilots flying without adequate training or sufficient documentation.
The same entry also charges that the flight manual “is inadequate and almost criminally insufficient.”
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/pilot-complaints-boeing-737-max/

Aircraft manufacturers release new aircraft then spend the next X amount of years fixing all the faults.

So no different to the MTB industry.

I flew the 2/3/4/5 variants of the 737s and they were great aircraft.
I just wonder if Boeing have developed it a step too far in an attempt to compete with Airbus and their relatively modern a320 series.
And yes, the iPad training does sound suspiciously light.

The training package for the new Airbus 320 NEO was an iBook and a quiz.

Not mandated by FAA

but I smell a lawsuit coming?

so it turns out that the bit of software that moderates the behaviour of the anti-stall systems has always been available – it’s just a ‘cost option’ that not all airlines opted for.

Can we have in flight safety?
*reverse whistle* Gonna cost you mate.
Oh, ok we’ll do without then.

Not a good look for anyone involved.

it’s just a ‘cost option’ that not all airlines opted for.

I thought it didnt actually moderate it but could be used to see there was a problem with the input into the system. However since Boeing had forgot to mention the new functionality it isnt unreasonable to not consider it an important feature.

Not mandated by FAA

Some slightly disturbing reading around how Boeing basically has self-certified its planes and the FAA has (it is suggested) gone “great, ta”.

Looks like yes, would tell pilots what the problem was.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-features-charge.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes

Boeing’s optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another.

Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes, according to a person familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they have not been made public. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy.

Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded.

“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”

The training package for the new Airbus 320 NEO was an iBook and a quiz.

NEO changed the engines (duh) to reduce noise and increase fuel efficiency, tweaked the wings, but had exactly the same cockpit. In theory, the pilot shouldn’t notice whether they are flying a NEO or not. EASA and FAA fully certified the changes.

737 max changed the cockpit to add an automatic trim adjustment that could crash the plane without building in proper redundant operation or pilot warning as standard (indicator light and AOA display were taken by the lead customer and are likely to become mandatory). They also managed to get the FAA to let Boeing sign it off as being “just another 737”.

There’s lots of changes with an A320 NEO. Different quick reaction drills, new flight modes to name but a few. It looks he same, but has lots of different features. PS – I’m qualified on it! The 737 NG to Max changes are of a similar magnitude – apart from this bonkers stall issue.

But the way in which a 320NEO flys is VERY similar to a 320CEO, right?

The aircraft CG is similar, the aerodynamic envelope is similar enough to not require the aviation equivalent of stability control and so on.

Boeing had similar stability and structural problems on the 747-8 during certification which resulted in a qualification without the trim tanks in the tail.

The way the 737 Max flies is very similar to the NG too. The FBW computers see to it, right up to the stall, where the thrust vectors of the new engine position create problems, necessitating the MCAS system (Automatic, so still no different to fly)

This is all a bit pointless. What I’m trying to say, is that both Boeing & Airbus have produced absolute bare minimum training packages for the new aircraft. You can jump in a Neo/Max to fly it from previous CEO/NG variants without any flight/simulator training. Which is wrong.

Plus – Daffy – the A320 is pure Fly By Wire. There is no trim, and the pilot control inputs are interpreted by the computers into rates of roll, and “g” inputs in pitch. It’s in full traction control the whole time!!

Well you can’t compare the Boeing and airbus philosophies. Airbus cockpits are much more common and they’ve programmed the aircraft all to fly like an A320…including the larger wide body jets. The cockpit layouts are extremely similar and the systems are too meaning minimal training between the aircraft (a few days instead of a couple of weeks). It’s been proven to be extremely safe and has actually significantly increased aircraft safety over the years, as has the Boeing system too – so claims training is somehow lax are completely unfounded and not backed up by any facts. And in anycase it’s not Boeing who stipulates training requirements, it’s the airworthiness authorities. They will design their aircraft in a way to minimise training burden between different aircraft in accordance with the airworthiness requirements, but they can’t just make this stuff up. It has to comply with airworthiness requirements, and pilots have to be certified under airworthiness authorities.

Also 737 is not fly by wire – well not on the main control surfaces at least…so they don’t have anywhere near the integration and similar flight handling characteristics between aircraft types as Airbus do apart from the fact they’re similar aircraft. The MAX does have different thrust line due to grandfather rights preventing Boeing from re-designing the undercarriage meaning engines had to be re-positioned, which in turn meant the MCAS system had to be introduced. No reason why it shouldn’t be perfectly safe – aircraft have had anit-stall features on them forever like stick pushers (which is basically what MCAS is in principle) as fitted to BAE 146’s and many other aircraft over the decades, and we await the final conclusions of the investigation to see if pilot training (or lack of) was a factor….or if it was a problem with the MCAS system, or the procedure pilots were trained to fly in the event the aircraft approached stall etc. We just don’t know…the investigation is in lockdown so everything you read is speculation and guessing. Just because Boeing has announced software changes doesn’t confirm that it has been concluded there is a problem with MCAS..it could be interim additional safety protocol being added rather than fixing an issue.

Some slightly disturbing reading around how Boeing basically has self-certified its planes and the FAA has (it is suggested) gone “great, ta”.

Well don’t be disconcerted because it’s BS. It could be a factor in this is the FAA airworthiness requirements weren’t stringent enough but that’s different. Firstly Boeing have to actually demonstrate to the FAA the aircraft is safe through thousands of hours of rigorous testing – both in flight, in simulators on rig tests etc. It costs billions. The FAA are no push-overs. The airworthiness authorities do work closely with the manufacturers…they have to understand the technology in order to determine what needs to be done to certify them. After all often they’re dealing with novel and new technology. And even if the FAA have been lenient then EASA and individual countries airworthiness authorities are not so ‘in-bed’ with Boeing as the FAA has been accused of, and are unlikely to have been so easily persuaded to have certified an unsafe aircraft design.

Let’s wait and see what facts emerge. I suspect there will be additional safety protocols added to the MCAS (probably just as much to reassure the public than anything) and additional pilot training requirements as a minimum and the MAX will go on to have a safety record as good if not better than any previous generation of 737 or any other aircraft.

The training package for the new Airbus 320 NEO was an iBook and a quiz.

Well, yes, but the Neo flies like any other A320. Bits that did change – rotation law for example – were well explained in the (company) iBook and the FCOM.

Airbus genuinely love adding new toys to their aircraft. They’ve pioneered AP/FD TCAS, runway overrun protection, take-off performance monitoring etc etc. Nothing goes through wind shear like an Airbus.

It’s not the flying bodge job that the 737 series has become. Because the 737 is a crock of shit, and because they’re desperate for fleet commonality, modern aircraft like the 787 drag on these sticking plasters and maintain a higher level of risk than just designing the flaws out in the first place. There are countless ways a 787 will turn around and bite you and they could all have been fixed before production.

Eg…
Google the “FLCH trap”.
Auto-thrust that doesn’t disconnect during a rejected take-off.
Thrust reversers that will deploy in the air.
Flight directors that switch off about 45 seconds into a go-around.
Battery fires.
Dual engine failures on the landing roll.
Computer hangovers in flight that silently load and activate yesterday’s flight plan.
Uncommanded changes to selected altitudes.
The same identical bing-bong sound effect for everything from the doorbell to ATC sending a clearance.
etc etc.

It’s my view that this is poor design coupled with lax oversight and was an accident waiting to happen. You don’t buy American cars for their reliability.

I must admit I’ve never flown the 737 – just the 777. The latest 737 variants sound like a bit of a nightmare.

A lengthy but comprehensive report here if anyone’s interested.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1249KS8xtIDKb5SxgpeFI6AD-PSC6nFA5/view

Because the 737 is a crock of shit

Stopped reading there. You were doing well.

Google the “FLCH trap”.
Auto-thrust that doesn’t disconnect during a rejected take-off.
Thrust reversers that will deploy in the air.
Flight directors that switch off about 45 seconds into a go-around.
Battery fires.
Dual engine failures on the landing roll.
Computer hangovers in flight that silently load and activate yesterday’s flight plan.
Uncommanded changes to selected altitudes.
The same identical bing-bong sound effect for everything from the doorbell to ATC sending a clearance.
etc etc.

It’s my view that this is poor design coupled with lax oversight and was an accident waiting to happen. You don’t buy American cars for their reliability.

As if there weren’t enough reasons to avoid Ryan Air…

As if there weren’t enough reasons to avoid Ryan Air…

Tell us about their safety record then?…. And I’m pretty sure they don’t have any 787’s.

Stopped reading there. You were doing well.

You do know that that’s one of our resident commercial pilots, don’t you?

You do know that that’s one of our resident commercial pilots, don’t you?

Yes. Which is why I stopped reading. I expect a bit better from someone in his position. The 737 is a very successful aircraft, to call it a ‘crock of shit’ is poor. In my opinion. I’m really into aviation and some of the discussions have been very interesting. But also lots of assumptions.

That report is excellent

That no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 MAX
seems to have even raised the issue of using multiple inputs,
including the opposite angle of attack sensor, in the

computer’s determination of an impending stall is mind-
blowing. As a lifetime member of the software development

fraternity, I don’t know what toxic combination of
inexperience, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding led to
this.

I can’t understand that at all.  Even when I was writing software just for X-ray machines I would have routines that check that the inputs are sane in various ways and that would have involved checking copies of the same signal where available and it was plainly obvious that you needed to do that.  That software is no-where near as serious as the MCAS software.  As it says in the report, I would be scared to rely on the same people who wrote the original software to be able to deliver a solution as it is a cultural issue as much as a coding one

Can we all just take a moment to celebrate what a powerful tool the internet has become :

You do know that that’s one of our resident commercial pilots, don’t you?

Yes. Which is why I stopped reading. I expect a bit better from someone in his position. The 737 is a very successful aircraft, to call it a ‘crock of shit’ is poor. In my opinion. I’m really into aviation and some of the discussions have been very interesting. But also lots of assumptions

crock of shit’

Possibly an exaggeration. But not by much, I think. The 737 of today is – somewhat confusingly – both unchanged and yet completely different from the first one that flew getting on for 50 years ago. Changed thanks to new technology yet according to Boeing similar enough that they maintain the same certification.

The tail clearance on longer models isn’t sufficient so approach speeds are higher. Controls are still pulleys and string, with hydraulic assistance but servo tabs as the ultimate backstop. The overhead panel is still the same shotgun approach to ergonomics as the original. Cabin pressurisation still requires pilot intervention. Generators need to be manually connected to the network. Bleed management isn’t automatic. Flight envelope protection is minimal.

There is an appalling pitch-power couple. The flight deck is cramped and uncomfortable. The caution and warning system isn’t integrated. Many flight management capabilities that make the pilot’s job easier (and free up capacity, hence safer) are software add-ons.

It’s a very basic aircraft, ultimately. One of the reasons it’s like this is because Boeing’s biggest customers are opposed to change. Southwest used to have their 737-NGs mirror the analogue displays of their older aircraft to avoid crew training expenses. IMHO – and it is only an opinion, which I believe I’m entitled to – is that that MAX should have been redesigned from scratch, implementing the technology developed on the 787. Instead we got an old design modified in what appears to be a hurry owing to commercial pressure from competitors.

The A320 series is 30 years old. You know how it reacts to an out-of-range angle of attack measurement? It votes it out of the computations and downgrades the landing capability slightly.

Can we all just take a moment to celebrate what a powerful tool the internet has become :

You do know that that’s one of our resident commercial pilots, don’t you?

Yes. Which is why I stopped reading. I expect a bit better from someone in his position. The 737 is a very successful aircraft, to call it a ‘crock of shit’ is poor. In my opinion. I’m really into aviation and some of the discussions have been very interesting. But also lots of assumptions

What are you trying to say?

Really interesting post flaperon.

“The A320 series is 30 years old. You know how it reacts to an out-of-range angle of attack measurement? It votes it out of the computations and downgrades the landing capability slightly.”

D-AIDP

What are you trying to say?

I read it that he’s pointing out the laughable juxtaposition of someone basically rubbishing a commercial pilots opinion, cos he’s read a bit about planes n that, online.

Could be wrong though. 😁

PPRuNe has been very insightful. Plenty of 737 pilots commenting there if anyone wants to wade through the thread.

https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/619272-ethiopian-airliner-down-africa-122.html

I have a few mates who are transport safety investigators. They won’t get on one. So that’s good enough for me.

“The A320 series is 30 years old. You know how it reacts to an out-of-range angle of attack measurement? It votes it out of the computations and downgrades the landing capability slightly.”

D-AIDP

This OEB covered the case where two AoA probes give incorrect measurements at the same time, and can lead to an uncontrollable pitch down moment.

A single AoA probe failure, however, is usually a non-event. If there is any doubt (IE the single measurement seems plausible and the voted measurement suspicious), the aircraft disables the protections and hands the decision to the pilot.

Sobering reading.